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I. Introduction
Since the mid-1970s a number of countries have resorted to import restrictions
through instruments such as voluntary export restraint agreements (VERs), which violate
the spirit, if not the letter, of the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). Increasing use has also been made of trade-restricting instruments that are
"GATT legal," the major example being antidumping (AD) measures. Both AD and VERs
are instruments of "contingent" protection, in that certain necessary conditions need to be
satisfied before either can be invoked.1
Understanding firm behaviour in import-competing sectors under the prospect of
protection requires careful attention to the nature of the incentives set up by these
alternative instruments of contingent protection. The prospect of contingent protection can
alter firm behaviour in a number of ways. That it may induce rent seeking behaviour is
now well known.2 Thus lobbying for protection is an unwelcome but anticipated by-
product of policies that offer the prospect of protection. In addition, threats of VERs or AD
are likely to influence the production and allocation decisions of both potentially affected
exporting firms abroad and intervention-seeking import-competing firms at home.S The
substitution possibilities between instruments of contingent protection for a given import-
competing industry establishes a "horizontal" link between these instruments. Thus the
initiation of AD is at times part of a strategy designed to induce foreign competitors to
agree to a VER, or to pressure the home government into negotiating bilateral quantitative
IA firm engages in dumping if the export price for its product is below the price charged
on the home market. If dumping can be shown to injure domestic import-competing firms
an antidumping duty equal to the dumping margin may be levied. AD and other
instruments of contingent trade policy are discussed further in Section II below.
2See Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974).
3Analyses of the impact of threats of contingent protection on exporting firms include
Feenstra (1988), Stockhausen (1988), Hoekman and Leidy (1989) and Leidy and Hoekman
(1990). Papers focusing on the incentive effeci of such instruments on the behaviour of
import-competing firms include Hillman, Katz and Rosenberg (1987), Messerlin (1989b),
Leidy and Hoekman (1989), and Staiger and Wolak (1989).
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restrictions with exporting nations.4
This paper extends the literature on the incentive effects of contingent protection by
identifying and analyzing the vertical linkages that may exist across instances of
contingent trade policy. That is, to what extent does it matter that there may be import-
competing sectors at various stages along the production stream, and that at each stage
firms have potential access to an array of instruments of contingent protection? In this
connection two paradoxes arise. First, upstream firms sometimes seek protection which
stands to severely injure, and perhaps destroy, their downstream customers. Second,
there have been examples of unaffiliated downstream firms (customers) supporting, rather
than opposing, such bids for potentially destructive protection.5 The analysis of this
paper rationalizes such behaviour. It is shown that the accessibility of VERs (or other
forms of contingent protection) in a downstream industry may induce upstream suppliers
of intermediate inputs to pursue AD even when it appears directly unprofitable to do so.
In general, access to instruments of contingent protection at more than one stage of the
production stream enhances the opportunity for components producers to engage in
"indirect rent seeking."6 This, in turn, increases the probability that each of the import-
competing sectors along the production stream will eventually win some form of relief from
foreign competition.
By initiating and winning an AD action, upstream suppliers can manipulate the
health of downstream firms. Because establishment of injury is the principal criterion that
4Many AD cases in the EC end with bilateral price or quantity agreements, while a large
percentage of initiated AD complaints in the U.S. are withdrawn before a final
determination, often due to agreement on a VER being reached (Messerlin, 1989a; Finger
and Murray, 1990).
5See Destler and Odell (1987), p.46.
6As discussed in Leidy and Hoekman (1989), indirect rent-seeking involves attempts to
manipulate the criteria established for gaining protection in order to enhance the
probability of winning protection in the future. Often this takes the form of firms adjusting
their decision variables so as to move closer to the point at which an injury investigation
will end in a favourable ruling.
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must be met before protection is granted, and since the probability of protection tends to
increase with the extent of injury, access to contingent protection upstream can help create
the conditions in which protection will be made available downstream. Because of this,
instances of contingent protection tend to cascade down the production stream.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We begin in Section II with a brief discussion of
alternative instruments of contingent protection and present a number of "stylized facts"
which emerge from an examination of specific instances of intervention seeking. In Section
III a simple model is developed in which an AD action by potential component producers
severely injures firms in a downstream industry. In Section IV a theory of the vertical
linkages across instances of contingent protection is developed that helps to explain the
tendency of contingent protection to cascade down the production stream. It is shown that
the pursuit of protection upstream can be rationalized as part of a strategy of indirect rent
seeking, even if the immediate effect is to bring on the near destruction of downstream
customers. Section V discusses some of the implications for the timing of anti-protectionist
activity on the part of downstream firms. Concluding remarks are in Section VI. It should
be noted that while the focus throughout is stimulated by U.S. trade law and experience,
the analysis is quite general.
II. Contingent Protection and Intermediates: Stylized Facts
The instruments of protection that are potentially available to import-competing
firms include antidumping and countervailing duties, emergency protection or safeguard
actions, market sharing arrangements such as VERs, and domestic price support schemes
(including subsidies). GATT rules require contracting parties to satisfy certain conditions
before they may act against dumped imports. Thus, before AD duties can be imposed it
must be demonstrated that: (1) imports are being dumped, i.e., the export price is below
the price charged by the exporter in its home market for the same product; and (2) that
this "materially" injures import-competing firms or threatens to. Article XIX of the GATT
allows members to impose emergency protection in cases where imports are seriously
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injuring domestic import-competing firms. In contrast to AD, emergency protection must
be nondiscriminatory (applied to imports from all countries).
VERs have developed into the major substitute for Article XIX-type safeguard
actions, largely because this allows countries to circumvent the nondiscrimination
requirement. While AD and safeguard actions are usually authorized by the domestic
legislation which implements GATT agreements, no formal rules exist for VERs.7 In
practice, however, petitioning firms will have to demonstrate import-related injury if they
are to have a significant probability of obtaining VER protection. VERs, price support
schemes, and subsidies will usually be the outcome of direct lobbying by the interested
industry. In contrast, AD is a "low level" or "technical" track procedure where political
influence plays at most a minor role in obtaining protection (Finger, Hall, and Nelson,
1982). If the requirements listed in the implementing legislation are met, intervention will
follow.8
Over 400 AD cases have been initiated in the U.S. alone during the 1980s. Many of
these pertain to intermediate goods, i.e., products that are used by industries in the
production of other goods. It appears obvious that, if imports of intermediates are
restricted, user industries will suffer as component prices rise. This in turn may lead
affected user industries to seek protection of some kind. Indeed, the conferred injury may
now qualify the user industries to receive protection. The U.S. experience illustrates that
such "cascading" may well be a common phenomenon. Depending on the linkages between
industries cascading may occur gradually or virtually instantaneously.
Textiles and apparel provide a good example of the latter possibility.9 The United
States cotton textile industry began actively to seek import protection during the latter half
7i~n the U.S. context Article XIX-type safeguard actions are known as escape clause or
Section 201 actions, after the relevant part of the implementing trade legislation.
8For a more extensive discussion of existing trade "remedies," see Jackson (1989).
9What follows draws on Aggarwal (1985), Giesse and Lewin (1987), and Hufbauer,
Berliner, and Elliot (1986).
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of 1954, and succeeded in getting Japanese producers to agree in December 1955 to
restrain the export of semi-finished cotton fabrics, especially velveteen and gingham.
Subsequent to the 1955 initiation by the velveteen industry of a Section 201 safeguard
investigation, the investigating authority announced in October 1956 that velveteen
producers were being injured by imports, thus opening the way for a significant increase in
tariffs. The gingham industry submitted an analogous application for import relief two
months after this positive injury finding.
The threat of such contingent protection helped induce Japanese producers to agree
in January 1957 to a five-year restriction on cotton textiles and apparel. It is noteworthy
that this agreement was not restricted to cotton fabric but also covered woven apparel and
knit goods, i.e., the end products or final goods. What emerged was a coalition of U.S.
producers of intermediate inputs (yarns, gingham, velveteen) and final good producers
(apparel, clothing) that managed to cooperate successfully during the next 35 years in
ensuring continued restrictions on access to the U.S. market. It can be speculated that the
credible threat of gingham and velveteen producers to further increase import tariffs on
their products made it both more attractive and necessary for apparel producers to ensure
that their products would also be subject to additional import restrictions.. In the case of
textiles it appears that producers of intermediates and final goods very quickly saw the
benefits of cooperating, perhaps in part because the upstream/downstream linkages are
very tight in this sector. Thus, instead of observing a gradual cascading of protection
across sub-sectors, the entire industry was protected almost from the outset. However, it
is important to note that the initial trigger came from producers of intermediates.
Steel provides an example where pressures for protection by upstream firms has
had a more gradual cascading effect. The postwar history of steel protectionism began
with the January 1969 agreements by the European Community, Japan and the United
.Kingdom to restrict their exports to the U.S.'0 The VERs affected oniy semi-finished
10The U.K. became subject to a VER as of January 1972. For a history and analysis of
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carbon and alloy steels, such as ingots, slabs, and sheet bars, and were negotiated under
threat of legislation limiting such steel imports to 9.6 per cent of the U.S. market.11 The
VERs expired at the end of 1974. Protectionist pressures re-emerged during 1977, this
time largely in the form of AD petitions. So as to avoid a spate of AD investigations/
actions, an import relief plan was designed: the so-called Trigger Price Mechanism (TPM).
The TPM set reference "normal value" prices for steel products. If imports were priced
below the TPM prices, they would be subject to "fast-track" AD actions. The TPM did not
succeed in restricting market access sufficiently to satisfy the U.S. industry. It filed a
large number of AD petitions in March 1980, with the result that trigger prices were
increased by about 12%. After November 1982, the TPM was replaced by a
comprehensive system of bilateral quota agreements, largely as the result of the
submission of over 100 unfair-trade petitions earlier in the year by major U.S. steel
producers. This quota system was extended through the 1980s, subsequent to a
Presidential decision in 1984 to negotiate 5-year "surge control" arrangements with all
major suppliers.
Throughout the period starting in 1969, the steel products for which protection was
obtained were semi-finished ones such as ingots, slabs, bars and wire. The resulting
increase in the U.S. prices presumably had a negative impact on industries using these
products relatively intensively. Such industries include producers of steel springs, metal
cans, fasteners (nuts and bolts), railroad equipment, motor vehicle parts, and bearings.12
One may therefore predict that, all other things equal, the probability that these user
industries would at some point seek protection from imports is higher than for other
industries. And, in practice, many of these industries have sought protection, some of
U.S. steel protectionism, see Jones (1986).
1Hufbauer, Berliner and Elliot (1986), p. 154. This and the following paragraph draw
heavily on this source.
12Destler and Odell (1987, p. 192) note that the U.S. input-output table indicates that
these are among the most "steel intensive" user industries.
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them successfully. The ball bearing industry sought and obtained protection as a result of
a Section 201 escape clause petition during the second half of the 19 70s. Industrial
fasteners were also given relief at the end of the 1970s as a result of an affirmative injury
finding in an escape clause case. Producers of railroad equipment initiated antidumping
and countervailing duty cases during the early 1980s, while the motor vehicle industry
obtained relief from imports after the initiation of a Section 201 complaint which resulted
in the 1981 negotiation of a VER with Japan.13
Pressures similar to those described above may arise in any importing country,
leading to similar reactions. Indeed, it is conceivable that the developments in the U.S.
could constitute a "demonstration effect," with other importing countries and their
domestic industries witnessing and mimicing U.S. actions. To the extent that this is the
case, in global terms the outcome will converge more rapidly to a situation of "managed
trade."
The relationship between upstream and downstream protection is a probabilistic one.
Upstream protection increases the likelihood of downstream protection by transmitting
injury. The extent of injury depends on the relative importance of the protected component
in the production process and the ease of substitution away from the protected component.
Clearly other variables play an independent explanatory role. Among the most important
is the political visibility (power) of the downstream industry. Furthermore, if both
upstream and downstream industries are experiencing increased competitive pressure from
imports, both may have an incentive to seek protection. In this case the action by the
upstream industry may accelerate (as well as facilitate) the protectionist responses of the
13See Hufbauer, Berliner and Elliot (1986), cases M- 15, M-20 and M-22 concerning
Section 201 cases brought by producers of bearings, fasteners, and motor vehicles. In
1979 an AD investigation was initiated against imported rail passenger cars and parts.
Subsequent o a "no injury" finding, countervailing duty actions were launched in 1983
against railway cars and undercarriage components. This time injury was found and
duties were imposed on the relevant imports of undercarriage parts in January 1984. The
railway case was withdrawn by the petitioner during the same year so that it is unclear
what the final outcome was. See USITC (1982, 1984) and USTR (1985).
8
downstream industry.
In the next section a formal model is presented in which an AD action upstream
eliminates the economic viability of downstream firms.1 On the surface, because such an
act directly threatens the customer base of domestic components suppliers, seeking
protection appears irrational. Nevertheless, as is more fully explored in Section IV, the
probabilistic link between upstream and downstream protection is sufficient to rationalize
such behaviour. The focus is on AD because of the widespread and increasingly frequent
use that is made of this instrument of contingent protection. For the sake of exposition,
the model describes an extreme case' in which there is initially no domestic import-
competing upstream industry. It serves to clarify the exposition without loss of generality.
It should be emphasized at the outset that it is not at all necessary that no domestic
component industry exists. All that changes if there is a pre-existing domestic component
industry is that in most circumstances it will clearly be in the industry's interest to seek
protection so that the apparent irrationality does not arise. The extreme case is
interesting precisely because it leads to the conclusion that even in instances where a
contingent trade policy action is likely to destroy the downstream customer, such action
may nonetheless be rational.15
III. Predatory Antidumping?
Consider a sole manufacturer of a tradable component used in the production of a
final good. The component manufacturer is located in country A. The component
manufacturer is able to transfer its monopoly power downstream to the final goods
14 Early AD laws in the U.S. and Canada required some showing of predatory intent as a
precondition for winning AD duties. While predatory intent has long since disappeared
from the statutes, the notion of predatory pricing rernains central to the language of the
popular press and the business community. The model in the next section illustrates one
way in which it is not dumping but the invocation of anti-dumping law that reflects
"predatory" behaviour.
15See Hoekman and Leidy (1991) for a general model of protectionist pressure under
unfair trade laws.
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industry, which is assumed to be competitive. In long-run competitive equilibrium the final
good's price is driven to the minimum of the long-run average total cost (LRATC), which is
a function of the component price. There are also competitive final goods producers in
country B which source components from the producer in country A. As the final good is
traded internationally, long-run competitive equilibrium in the final goods market requires
(1) CB(wB9 =CA(wA) = Pw
where C(w) denotes a long-run unit cost function, w is a vector of input prices, and Pw is
the world price of the final good. We assume that the final goods producers in B are at a
technologically-based disadvantage relative to those in A so that C B(wB) > CA(wA) for
all wB r wA. Hence, in order for the final goods industry in B to be economically viable,
wB < wA is necessary.
The component supplier in A perceives markets A and B to be segmented against re-
export of components. It knows therefore that it can sell components in B as long as there
is a component-price differential in favour of B firms such that equation (1) holds; that is,
as long as B firms are not priced out of the market. Finally, we assume that the
component supplier views the export market to be economically small so that it perceives
that it can supply this market any amount up to a capacity constraint at the component
price that just makes B producers of the final good competitive. In other words, it is as if
the component supplier faces perfectly elastic demand for components abroad, but the
component price at which foreign demand is perfectly elastic is sensitive to the component
price selected for the domestic market.
The foreign and domestic market for components are linked implicitly through
equation (1). When the firm is choosing the optimal component price for the home market
it must consider the effect of its decision on the feasible price for the export market B. The
firm maximizes the following objective function:
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(2) wA(xA)xA + WB(WA(XA))XB -CA + xB)
subject to a capacity constraint in the export market. Component quantities offered in the
foreign and domestic markets are determined by the first-order conditions:
(3) MRA(xA) + (dwB/dwA)(dwA/dxA)xB - C'(xA+xB)=0
(4) wB(wA(xA)) - C'(xA+xB) = 0,
where equation (4) holds for an interior solution only. A corner solution results if at
xB = 0, the left-hand side of (4) is strictly less than zero or at xB =xB, the capacity
constraint facing final goods producers in B, the left-hand side is strictly greater than zero.
Suppose that x is chosen so that MRA(x{ss ;A})= C'(x{ss ;A}). If xB is selected to
equal zero, this maximizes the objective function (2) if the left-hand side of (4) is strictly
less than zero. Indeed, xB =0 is a solution whenever wB(wA(x{ss ;A})) < C'(x{ss ;A})
Otherwise, xB>
is a solution. Figure 1 shows conditions under which xB > 0 will be optimal. At point A
the firm can increase its profit by dumping some components in country B. But as it
begins to do so the marginal revenue associated with component sales at home declines,
since the middle term in (3) is no longer zero. This, in turn, induces the component
supplier to cut back its component sales in A. As it does so the component price in A rises
above w{ss ;A}, which increases the component price available in B. The static equilibrium
in this case is shown in Figure 1 by points B and C.
Point C determines the equilibrium level of component production. The amount
supplied to domestic final goods producers is indicated by point B. The difference C - B is
the quantity of components "dumped" in country B. Notice that the equilibrium allocation
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of components has the component supplier dumping in B, while the domestic component
price exceeds what it would be if dumping were not feasible (i.e., wB < w{ss ;A} < WA)'
This also suggests that in the final goods market the competitive equilibrium price exceeds
what it would be if the component supplier were not dumping in B. This makes sense
since it is the fact of dumping that enables the relatively inefficient producers in B to exist.
The higher final goods price simply reflects their presence in the market.
This last observation is revealing. Suppose that a credible anti-dumping threat arises
and effectively prohibits price discrimination, i.e., requires wA = wB. The component
supplier knows that the entire demand for components in B is sustained only because it
was offering a lower price to final goods producers in B. The latter's ability to profitably
produce given the world price PW = C(NA), derives from the willingness and ability of the
foreign component supplier to offer them a lower component price. In other words, their
viability under competitive conditions depends on continued price discrimination in their
favour. When that option is effectively eliminated by the imposition of an AD threat, the
component supplier will revert to point A in Figure 1. The component price prevailing in A
falls to w{ss ;A} and, in the long run, this drives the world price of the final good down to
Pw = C(w{ss ;A}). The lower world price of the final good now reflects the elimination
from the market of the relatively inefficient producers in country B.
What is the source of the antidumping threat and what is the intent of such a
threat? While no domestic component industry exists in B, a potential domestic component
industry may exist, and may appear to be "materially retarded" by the foreign
components dumping. Such firms have legal standing under GATT-conforming AD law.16
The potential component suppliers may argue that they too could supply components at
the higher price prevailing in A (NA - given that the market is sealed against imports of
components else dumping could not occur in the first place - but that they are prevented
ieMaterial retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry producing a like product
is one of the permitted causes for acting against dumped imports under GATT rules.
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from doing so as long as foreign dumping is occurring. They may credibly claim that they
could profitably sell components at a price below WA but above W^B. This implies that all
the technical requirements for obtaining AD protection have been met. The facts are
incontrovertible. The component supplier in A is charging a price that is "less than fair
value" (A >WB). In addition, the establishment of a potential component industry in
country B is being materially retarded by this pricing policy.
The intent of the industry association representing the potential domestic component
suppliers would appear to be to drive up the component price to a point where domestic
component production becomes an economically viable new line of business. Yet if
domestic final goods manufacturers do not have access to low cost components they cannot
compete on the world market. If the antidumping threat was intended to achieve the
establishment of a domestic component industry, therefore, it appears to fail miserably.
At the pre-AD equilibrium shown in Figure 1 potential component suppliers in B had to be
able to offer a component price at least as low as wB. But this was not sufficiently high to
produce a component industry in B. After the AD action is imposed, given the lower
component price available in A and the consequently lower world price for the final good,
potential component suppliers in B must be able to offer a price at least as low iB. This
implies that the likelihood of the emergence of a component industry in B under current
market conditions has declined relative to that before the AD law.
Why would the potential components industry ever expend resources to bring an AD
case under such circumstances? It may be that they lacked the necessary information. In
this case, interestingly, it is AD and not dumping that produces a predatory result, as the
AD action causes the final goods sector in B to lose competitiveness. If it is assumed
instead that complete information is available to the potential components industry, one
must question the rationality of the AD petition. This issue is addressed in the next
section.
13
IV. Prospects for Cascading Contingent Protection
Across Vertically Linked Industries
The scenario presented above has an upstream import-competing potential
component industry inflicting harm on a downstream industry by exercising its rights
under antidumping law. Contrary to the initial appearance that such an action is
irrational (under complete information), it can be rationalized in terms of a potential
domestic component industry knows that there are no direct profits available from bringing
an AD action, indeed on the surface there appear to be only process-related costs, the AD
action may enhance profits through an indirect channel. The potential component industry
is in a position to inflict systemic injury on a domestic downstream import-competing
industry. As injury is a necessary condition (and, at times, sufficient de facto) for an
industry to gain protection from foreign competition, the component industry may thus be
able to induce the downstream industry to seek either emergency protection or, more
likely, a VER, while also enhancing the probability that it will be granted. In this sense,
the AD action taken upstream causes the intervention seeking downstream. Protection, if
granted, is not likely to simply restore normal profitability. To the extent that rents are
created, the possibility that upstream firms stand to share in these rents may be the
proximate cause of the AD action.
As noted earlier, if a domestic component industry already exists and competes with
imports, the rationale for seeking protection is much easier to discern. In this case, the
apparent irrationality of initiating AD does not arise as the liklihood of extreme injury to
the downstream industry will be much less. Nonetheless, it remains the case that
upstream protection is likely to be directly detrimental to the downstream industry and
thus create an incentive for seeking protection in turn. While the subsequent discussion
continues to focus on the case of a potential domestic component industry, the discussion is
quite general in that a similar analysis holds in instances where a domestic import-
competing industry already exists.
Figure 2 characterizes the prospects facing the potential component industry and the
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domestic user industry. The potential component industry chooses first whether or not to
pursue AD (with some related process costs). If AD is pursued, the appropriate
government agency assesses the facts and makes its ruling. Either AD duties are
imposed, or they are not. The downstream industry, having observed the choice of the
upstream industry and the outcome of the AD investigation (if applicable) can choose to
seek protection (a VER), or to do nothing.1 7 If a VER is pursued (with its related process
costs), whether it is won or not is the decision of government authorities. The probability
of obtaining a favourable outcome depends on several criteria, including the extent to
which the industry appears to be injured. Hence the expected outcome of the VER petition
is affected favourably by the imposition of AD duties, other things equal.18
Note that this is a sequential decision problem, as there is no simultaneous
interaction between the potential component supplier and the downstream industry. In
contrast to so-called emergency protection (i.e., Section 201 of U.S. trade law), it is
appropriate to think of government as being passive because AD is not granted based on
broad "social welfare" criteria. Indeed, AD laws offer governments little discretion in
applying the technical criteria.19 The discretion that does exist provides little room for
1 71n the U.S., downstream firms will usually initiate AD or Section 201 emergency
protection actions, as this is usually a necessary step in obtaining VERs. In what follows
it is assumed that the downstream industry seeks a VER, but this is for illustrative
purposes only. A more complete analysis would need to determine endogenously the
optimal instrument of contingent protection for the downstream industry.
18The likelihood of winning a VER is also affected by the political visibility of the industry.
Factors affecting this include aggregate employment, whether the industry is
geographically concentrated or dispersed, the legislative power and committee
memberships of interested representatives, and so on. As pointed out by Hillman, Katz
and Rosenberg (1987) a firm or industry may attempt to manipulate its political visibility
at the margin through its employment decision. Such behaviour would also fall under the
general category of indirect rent seeking. Indeed, if Hillman-Katz-Rosenberg insurance
action is taken downstream, this has the indirect effect of increasing the probability that
an AD (or similar) action will be taken upstream. This is true since by increasing its
political visibility, the downstream firm increases the likelihood that a strategy of indirect
rent seeking upstream will be successful.
19Section 45 of the Special Import Measures Act (which implements the Tokyo Round
Codes) introduces consideration of the public interest into Canada's unfair trade law. Such
consideration is not required, however, and, as observed by Porteous and Rugman (1989),
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active gaming on the part of the government agencies involved. The decision to grant a
VER downstream is also treated as exogenous. This is justified as an approximation since
the government's role in negotiating a VER is largely reactive, as it begins only after
sufficient injury has jarred the political process into motion.
The ordinal payoffs appear at the bottom of the decision tree and are assumed to
reflect the ranking of expected profits for each industry in each state.> The current
ordering of payoffs is justified in the following way. The payoffs for the potential
component industry appear as the first entry in the ordered pairs. Comparing the first
entry in the payoff (4,4) to all other payoffs for the upstream industry indicates that it
stands to profit most if AD is pursued and won, and the downstream industry pursues and
wins a VER. Under this scenario, the AD petition either drives the existing foreign
suppliers out of the domestic market or causes them to recoil substantially from that
market. The payoff to the potential domestic component industry is greatest since it is
now in a position to sell to the domestic downstream industry without (or with greatly
reduced) foreign competition, while the downstream industry has access to VER-generated
rents, some of which can be captured through component pricing by the upstream firms.2 1
Observe that this state does not yield the highest possible payoff to the downstream
industry. It stands to profit most when no AD is granted yet a (comparable) VER is
nevertheless won (payoffs 0,5 and - 1,5). In this case, downstream producers retain
there were just three public-interest hearings initiated (from a pool of 29 completed unfair
trade actions) in the four years following the inception of section 45. EC legislation has a
"community interest" clause which reportedly has no practical effect (Messerlin,
1989a). Hence, government cannot be treated as an active player whose objective is to
maximize social welfare even in instances where the public interest is at least nominally
part of the unfair trade law.
2In principle, they may also represent the present value of expected utilities. The impact
of alternative decision rules is discussed below.
21Note that to the extent that upstream firms can capture downstream protection-
generated rents, the implicit assumption is that not all of the rents are taken away. If the
upstream industry were to capture all of these rents there would be no incentive for the
downstream industry to seek protection.
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access to low-cost foreign components while also gaining protection from foreign
competition through the VER. The upstream sector gains nothing in this case since they
continue to face competition by low-cost foreign components.2 It should be pointed out,
however, that while this state offers the highest possible payoff to the downstream
industry, it may be available with a very low probability due to the relatively healthy state
of the industry in the absence of upstream protection. In those cases where AD is pursued
but not granted, the payoff of -1 to the potential component industry reflects the process-
related cost of initiating the AD investigation. These states are represented by the payoffs
(-1,5), (-1, -1) and (-1,0).
Now consider the case in which AD is won but no VER is granted downstream.
Under the market conditions outlined in Section III, winning AD effectively eliminates the
downstream sector's ability to profit (without protection). More generally, the downstream
sector's profitability will be reduced. The payoff to the downstream industry is -2 if no
VER was pursued (reflecting the loss due to the conferred injury), and -3 if the process
cost associated with pursuing a VER was also incurred. In both cases the upstream
industry's payoff is - 1, reflecting the process costs incurred. Finally, if no AD is pursued
by the potential component industry, they neither gain nor lose. Should the downstream
sector pursue a VER and lose, a process-related cost is incurred without any offsetting
benefit and the payoff is -1.
What is the likely path along the decision tree and on what does it depend? Without
additional information, this is unclear, as the connection between decisions and payoffs is
currently random, the probabilities are not specified and a decision rule is absent.
Consider the issue of a decision rule first. For illustrative purposes only, suppose that a
maximin decision rule is employed. Then a solution is, in fact, clear. If each agent acts so
"It is commonly argued that VERs generate rents that are shared between the protected
domestic industry and the competing foreign industry charged with reducing its exports.
Note that if a foreign components producer is able to capture some of these rents, this is
another channel through which VER-generated rents rnay accrue to foreign firms.
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as to maximize the minimum possible payoff (sometimes called maximizing security), then
no AD and no VER will be pursued under the current rankings as long as there is some
uncertainty over the granting of contingent protection. The solution is payoff (0,0), i.e.,
the non-protectionist status quo. But such a decision rule clearly reflects a degree of risk
aversion that is not representative of real-world economic agents. Will a more realistic
decision rule produce the non-protectionist result?2 3
When contingent protection is an uncertain outcome, and when an expected utility or
expected profit-based decision rule is used, it can be argued that the cascading of
contingent protection across vertically linked industries becomes the most plausible result
under circumstances that are not uncommon. Suppose that each industry is acting as if to
maximize the capitalized value of expected profitability. That is, the upstream component
industry will pursue AD only if the expected present value of profits under the pursuit of
AD exceed those under passivity ("free trade"). The same applies to the downstream firm
(industry). A VER will be pursued if the expected value of doing so (given the outcome of
the decision of the upstream industry) exceeds that of doing nothing.
The decision taken by the upstream and downstream industry is dichotomous: pursue
protection or remain passive. The choice is based on a comparison of the capitalized value
of expected future profit flows under protection versus those under "free trade." Under
expected profit maximization (risk neutrality) this implies a simple comparison of these
expected capitalized values. As the present values associated with "free trade" and
protection are random variables, under expected utility maximization (and risk aversion)
2 3Note that the maximin decision rule will produce a different path if we move to the
certainty case. If both AD duties and a VER will be granted with certainty when pursued,
the equilibrium path shifts to the state in which both AD and a VER are pursued and
awarded. That is, in deciding whether to pursue AD, the upstream industry faces a payoff
of 0 with certainty if no AD is pursued. It faces a payoff of 4 with certainty if it can be
sure that the downstream firm will pursue a VER once AD has been imposed. Since the
decision tree, payoffs and probabilities are all common knowledge, they can indeed be
certain that a VER will be pursued (and so won), since this is the optimal choice under
maximin for the downstream industry. Hence, the upstream industry chooses AD and the
downstream industry chooses to pursue a VER. In this case, the maximin decision rule
produces a cascading of contingent protection across vertically linked industries.
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the variance of the present value of profit becomes relevant. If the payoffs at the bottom
of the decision tree were expressed in terms of expected utilities, the resulting ranking
need not be identical to that based on expected profits. As discussed further in the
Appendix, if variances are sufficiently different under protection versus free trade,
rankings may differ depending on the decision rule that is imposed. Precisely what type of
rule is followed is not important. What matters is the ranking of the payoffs associated
with each state. For purposes of discussion, in what follows it is assumed that an expected
profit decision rule is in place.
Several observations can then be made. The expected value of pursuing AD relative
to remaining passive depends on several factors, including the following: (1) the level of
the process costs associated with an AD petition; (2) the likelihood of winning AD; (3) the
likelihood of the downstream firm pursuing a VER given that AD duties have been
imposed; (4) the probability of winning a VER given AD duties; (5) the expected
profitability of a VER if granted; and (6) the extent to which the upstream firm can expect
to capture a share of the VER-generated downstream rents.2 4 In general, the stronger
the link between a successful AD petition and the likelihood of winning a VER, the greater
the incentive facing the upstream industry to indirectly seek a VER downstream by
manipulating the health of the downstream industry via an AD action. If the probability
of winning a VER is closely related to the industry's current health, and if a successful AD
petition will seriously injure the downstream industry, then a successful AD petition can
substantially increase the probability of that a downstream industry will pursue and win a
VER. Finger and Murray (1990) argue that in the United States the injury criterion is
central to the likelihood of gaining a favourable outcome in an unfair trade case. Hence
manipulating the health of a downstream industry can be crucial to the decision to grant
protection. In effect, the raison d'etre for the AD petition is as much to obtain the VER
24As noted in the Appendix, if an expected-utility-maximization rule is followed, the size of
the relevant variances may also be important.
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downstream as it is to weaken the competitive position of the foreign component supplier
in the domestic market.
V. Anti-Protectionist Activities and Vertical Linkages
The model of vertical linkages presented above has a number of implications for the
timing of anti-protectionist activities. When an upstream industry pursues protection in
the absence of the incentives outlined in the model, it will be in the interest of downstream
users to oppose it. Other things equal, the more significant is the protected component to
downstream production and the fewer are the available substitutes, the more anti-
protectionist activity one would expect to see because of the expected costs to downstream
firms. Indeed, to the extent that downstream users can mobilize quickly, one would expect
such opposition to arise early in the process, possibly during the petition stage or shortly
after protection has been won. Yet often anti-protectionist forces appear to descend well
after upstream protection has been granted, if at all. The question then arises to what
extent can delays in anti-protectionist activity, or persistent inactivity, be attributed to the
vertical linkages across instances of contingent protection.
In their analysis of antiprotectionist responses to VER or Section 201 intervention
seeking, Destler and Odell (1987) point out that in response to recurring petitions for
protection by the U.S. steel industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was
"...virtually no observable opposition from U.S. steel users."2 5 They state further that
some steel users "even helped the other side".26 As possible explanations for the absence
of opposition (they offer none for the pro-protection activity) they suggest the following:
that steel users suffer from the free rider problem, that "such firms tend to think of
imports as, basically, something bad," and that "some are more inclined to seek protection
for their own products." With respect to the second rather sociological explanation, all we
2p. 46. See also their Appendix tables A6 and A7.
2 6These and the following quotes are from pp 46-47. Emphasis added.
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will say is that competition fortunately tends either to disabuse economic agents of such
superstitions or to purge them from the market. The observation that steel users may
suffer from the free rider problem is, in fact, contradicted by the authors' own observation
that some steel users "helped" the steel industry - and thus expended resources - to
seek protection. In a footnote relating to the final possible explanation, which they did not
pursue, Destler and Odell state that "In theory, of course, a firm could actively seek open
markets for its inputs and shelter for its outputs. While such a stand would be
economically rational, it could be politically embarrassing and hard to sustain" (p. 47,
emphasis added).
To the contrary, the foregoing analysis suggests that at times it is not economically
rational to oppose upstream protection precisely because such protection, by conferring
injury, may aid downstream firms in their own efforts to gain protection. If the
downstream industry expects the injury conferred from upstream protection to
significantly enhance its chances of gaining a VER, then the injury may be perceived as a
gift, not something to lobby against. At least this is true in the short run, before the
resolution of uncertainty concerning the benefit of conferred injury.2 Hence the observed
delay in anti-protectionist activity among downstream firms, and the assistance given to
producers of semi-finished steel is fully rationalized by the theory of indirect rent seeking
and vertical linkages. In the case of steel most major domestic users demonstrated no
activity against protection, e.g. motor vehicles and parts, metal cans, bearings, screw
machine products, industrial fasteners, and railroad equipment. Did these industries
engage in protection-seeking activity during the "wait-and-see" period? As noted in Section
II, many of these user industries indeed obtained or lobbied for protection following the
upstream episode. The second paradox stated at the outset of this paper - that some
2Much will depend here on possibilities for downstream firms to substitute away from the
protected input. To the extent that substitution is relatively easy, upstream firms will
have less "power"~ over downstream firms. But, the downstream industry may still abuse
the upstream threat to get protection. See also Hoekman and Leidy (1991).
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downstream firms "even helped the other side" - is entirely consistent with the incentives
underlying the theory of cascading contingent protection.
VI. Conclusions and Implications for Further Research
In this paper a simple model was developed in which component dumping occurs.
For illustrative purposes, dumping by the foreign industry is assumed to be just sufficient
to establish the viability of domestic final goods producers on the world market. That is, in
the absence of protection, access to the dumped component is necessary and sufficient to
the existence of the domestic final goods industry. Hence the domestic final goods industry
is hanging by the thread of dumped components in a competitive world market. Even in
such an extreme case, where an AD action upstream may set in motion the apparent
demise of the domestic final goods industry and thus paradoxically appears to inhibit the
establishment of a domestic component industry, clear incentives exist for the initiation of
an AD action upstream. Of course, these'incentives also exist in less extreme instances
where protection-seeking is more obviously in the interest of import-competing upstream
firms. One such instance is the case where the domestic industry is already engaged in
competing with imports. In practice this will usually be the case (see Section II). Another
instance is if the upstream and downstream industries are related. In this case the
expected value of joint profits will be maximized, with the decision whether to pursue
protection upstream being determined by a straightforward optimization problem. The
general point is that by seeking protection the upstream firm can favourably influence the
probability of protection downstream with an eye toward capturing some of the expected
rents.
Based on these incentives a theory of cascading protection in the presence of
vertically-linked markets was developed. The connections are twofold: one rather obvious,
the other quite subtle. Contingent protection tends to flow downstream naturally because
of the transmission of injury. Even when upstream suppliers give no thought to the
welfare of their downstream customers, the transmission of injury establishes a vertical
22
link across instances of contingent protection. In addition to this, contingent protection
may be pursued precisely because of the likelihood of downstream injury and cascading
protection. In this way the upstream industry engages in indirect rent seeking. Without
this possibility, one would expect fewer instances of intervention seeking in upstream
industries than otherwise, more anti-protectionist activity, and the absence of cases where
unaffiliated downstream firms actually support upstream bids for protection.
The analysis offers insight into the design of trade policies that would reduce and
perhaps preclude the protectionist outcomes described above. If a government could
credibly precommit to not granting protection in downstream industries, not only would it
eliminate the pursuit of protection downstream, but it also creates an inhibiting effect that
is transferred upstream where the incentive to pursue AD may be sharply reduced as well.
More specifically, since the raison d'etre for some AD petitions may be the pursuit of a
downstream VER, eliminating the VER option can have the added benefit of removing (or
diminishing) the incentive to pursue structurally disruptive antidumping duties in
components industries.
While the foregoing analysis has focused on a specific example for the sake of
expositional clarity and simplicity, the results are certainly generalizable. There is,
however, a need for a more comprehensive analysis of the possible linkages across
instances of contingent protection. Given the existence of multiple instruments of
contingent protection at each stage of the production stream, the choice of optimal
instruments presents itself as a problem for further study. There is also the possibility
that cascading proceeds from downstream to upstream protection. Much will depend here
on the extent to which the upstream industry is able to capture downstream rents.
Additionally, upstream and downstream producers might play games over the distribution
of the expected rents from protection, implying a need to go beyond the sequential decision
framework used above to allow for strategic interaction between the industries involved.
Such research is likely to enhance our understanding of the intervention-seeking incentives
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facing vertically linked industries.
Nevertheless, the point of departure for further research is established by the
central insight of this paper that in an area where others have seen only a divergence of
interests facing domestic import-competing suppliers and users, our analysis suggests a
potential confluence of interests. And this confluence of interests points to an important
link across instances of contingent protection along the production stream.
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The purpose of this Appendix is to clarify the conditions
under which the rankings of payoffs under maximization of
expected profit - E(i) - will correspond to those under
maximization of the expected utility of profits - E[U(i) ] . Let
iF and ip be the present value of profit under free trade (no
intervention) and protection, respectively. For simplicity, let
fTr - i.i.d. N(pF, a0) and iri - i.i.d. N (p,ai) in each future period.
Since under the normality assumption E[U(lit)] (i=P,F) can be
written as a function of the first two moments, E [ U( lip) ] and
E[U(it)] can be expressed as V( ,aP) and V(pLa,), respectively,
where preferences are not state dependent and the first
derivatives are V1 > 0 and V2 < 0 (the latter implies risk
aversion). If ao = oF, then the ranking of E[U(i 1)] corresponds
to the ranking of E (ii) . More generally, as long as pp > py, then
V (AP aQ)> V(pg, a) for all ao s oa. Given p > p, for the ranking.
of E[U(i) ] to reverse that based on E (it) it is necessary that
ap > ao. Only if this is the case is it possible that under an
expected-utility decision rule agents could prefer free trade in
instances where an expected-profit rule indicates a preference
for protection.
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